

Message Text

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FOLLOWING REPEAT USNATO 4026 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO MADRID
ALL NATO CAPITALS APR 19.
QUOTE S E C R E T USNATO 04026

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EMBASSY MOSCOW

E.O.11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: NATO, PORG
SUBJECT: ALLIANCE EAST-WEST STUDY: NEW COMPOSITE PART III
DRAFT

-
REFS: (A) USNATO 3974, (B) USNATO 3849

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1. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW THE TEXT WITH COVER LETTER OF THE
NEW COMPOSITE DRAFT PART III AS PREPARED BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL STAFF. NEW VERSION INCORPORATES THE CHANGES
PROPOSED IN THE APRIL 17-18 SPC SESSIONS (REF A) TO
PREVIOUS COMPOSITE TEXT (REF B).

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ACTION REQUESTED: PER REF A AND IS COVER LETTER BELOW,
WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON NEW DRAFT PART III TEXT AND ON
DISPOSITION OF SECTION D OF PART II. WE NEED THESE
INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO SPC MEETING SCHEDULED FOR MAY 2.
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2. BEGIN TEXT OF IS COVER LETTER:

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ATTACHED IS A REVISED DRAFT OF PART III OF THE STUDY AS IT
EMERGED FROM THE COMMITTEE'S DISCUSSION ON 17TH AND 18TH
APRIL, 1978.

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2. AS WAS SUGGESTED AT THAT MEETING, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL
IF DELEGATIONS COULD TRANSMIT THIS DRAFT TO THEIR CAPITALS
FOR INSTRUCTIONS, AND ALSO SEEK THE VIEWS OF THEIR AUTHORI-
TIES ON WHETHER THE DRAFT AS NOW PRESENTED MIGHT PROVIDE

AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR SECTION D OF PART II OF THE STUDY.

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3. IT HAS NOW BEEN AGREED THAT THE COMMITTEE SHOULD EXAMINE THIS DRAFT AT A MEETING TO BE HELD ON TUESDAY, 2ND MAY AT 3:30 PM. AT THAT MEETING, THE UNITED STATES SUGGESTIONS IN ITS LETTER OF 7TH APRIL, 1978 FOR HANDLING PARAGRAPHS 116 OF PART I AND 42BIS AND 42TER OF PART II COULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED.

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3. BEGIN TEXT OF NEW COMPOSITE PART III DRAFT:

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PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE

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1. IN THE SITUATION WHERE SECURITY BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AFTER WORLD WAR II, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AFFIRMED THE DETERMINATION OF ITS SIGNATORIES TO ALLY THEMSELVES "TO SAFEGUARD THE FREEDOM, COMMON HERITAGE AND CIVILISATION OF THEIR PEOPLES, FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW...TO PROMOTE STABILITY AND WELL-BEING (AND) TO UNITE
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THEIR EFFORTS FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY". SINCE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED, THE WORLD HAS PROFOUNDLY CHANGED. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT HAVE NEVERTHELESS REMAINED AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT AND MOST SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE WAY IN WHICH THESE RELATIONS DEVELOP WILL LARGELY SHAPE THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

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2. THE SOVIET UNION IS ON THE THRESHOLD OF A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP WHICH, WITHIN THE SPACE OF A FEW YEARS, WILL BRING A NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS TO POWER. THE NEW SOVIET LEADERS ARE UNLIKELY TO BREAK THE BASIC CONTINUITY OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES: DRAMATIC RUPTURES WITH THE PAST ARE IMPROBABLE. NEVERTHELESS, DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION, DELAY, UNCERTAINTY AND EVEN CONTRADICTIONARY INITIATIVES ARE POSSIBLE. FURTHERMORE, THE LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION COULD PRODUCE AT LEAST INITIALLY, A GOVERNMENT LESS SECURE AND THEREFORE LESS DISPOSED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE WEST. CHANGES IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THEREFORE, ARE NOT LIKELY TO MAKE DEALING WITH THE USSR ANY EASIER; MELLOWING OF THE REGIME COULD COME, IF AT ALL, ONLY IN THE PERIOD BEYOND OUR STUDY.

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3. THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE TO GRAPPLE WITH A NUMBER OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS. THE EXPECTED CONTINUING SLOWDOWN IN THE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH WILL INCREASE PRESSURES FOR REFORM OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURES. A MAJOR UNCERTAINTY IS

THE EXTENT TO WHICH ECONOMIC CHANGE WILL BE INHIBITED BY
FEAR OF THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

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4. CERTAINLY THE NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS WILL BE AS
DEVOTED AS THEIR PREDECESSORS TO MAINTAINING THE PRIMACY OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE SYSTEM BY WHICH THEY MAINTAIN
THEIR POWER IS UNLIKELY TO EVOLVE SIGNIFICANTLY DURING THIS
PERIOD IN A MORE LIBERAL DIRECTION. DISSIDENTS WITHIN THE
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SOVIET UNION WILL NOT CONSTITUTE A MAJOR SOURCE OF INSTA-
BILITY FOR THE REGIME. HOWEVER THE LEADERS WILL HAVE TO
COPE WITH GROWING SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN A SOCIETY GRADUALLY
BECOMING BETTER EDUCATED, MORE DEMANDING AND MORE AWARE
OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

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5. THE POTENTIAL FOR BOTH CHANGE AND INSTABILITY IS MAR-
KEDLY GREATER IN EASTERN EUROPE THAN IN THE SOVIET UNION.
DISSENT IN SOME PARTS OF EASTERN EUROPE--IN PARTICULAR IN
POLAND--HAS ROOTS IN POPULAR ECONOMIC DISSATISFACTION AS
WELL AS INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION AND NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS
LOYALTIES. THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL NOT RENOUNCE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE THE EUROPEAN GLACIS GAINED FROM THE LAST
WAR, WHATEVER THE COSTS OF CONTINUED CONTROL. OUTBURSTS
OF UNREST COULD WELL OCCUR, BUT THERE IS NO REASON TO DOUBT
THE DETERMINATION OR ABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO RETAIN
CONTROL, BY MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY.

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6. IN THE EXTERNAL FIELD, THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO
ASSERT ITSELF AS A SUPER-POWER. THE FIRST CONCERN WILL
REMAIN THE DEFENCE OF THE HOMELAND ON BOTH WESTERN AND
EASTERN FRONTIERS INCLUDING RETENTION OF THE EUROPEAN GLACIS.
BEYOND THE GLACIS, THE SOVIET UNION WILL MAINTAIN ITS
EFFORTS TO ASSERT ITSELF AS THE DOMINANT POWER IN EUROPE.
OUTSIDE EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE SUCH
OPPORTUNITIES AS OCCUR TO EXTEND ITS PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE,
WHenever THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT PROVOKING A DANGEROUS
CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST. IN ASIA IT WILL CONTINUE TO
FACE THE OPPOSITION OF CHINA, WHICH MIGHT AGREE AT SOME
POINT TO AN IMPROVEMENT OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS BUT WILL NOT
ACCEPT A RESUMPTION OF THE 1950 RELATIONSHIP.

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7. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN ITS DETENTE
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POLICY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS,
IT MAY BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS THOUGH THE BASIC
DIFFERENCES IN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN CONCEPTS OF DETENTE
WILL NOT CHANGE. THE BASIC AIM OF PREVENTING A DIRECT CLASH
BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED. OTHER

ASPECTS OF DETENTE WHICH CARRY MATERIAL BENEFITS FOR THE USSR ARE ALSO LIKELY TO BE PURSUED, BUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE PROCESS IS CARRIED OUT WILL DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE EXERCISED ON IT BY THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, THE EXTENT OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AS WELL AS WESTERN POLICIES TOWARDS THE USSR.

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8. THE STEADY ENHANCEMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH ACROSS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF CAPABILITIES WILL REMAIN A TOP PRIORITY FOR THE KREMLIN. THEIR AIM OF NO LESS THAN PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES IS UNLIKELY TO WEAKEN. THE NECESSARY RESOURCES WILL BE FOUND EVEN AT THE COST OF FURTHER SACRIFICES BY THE SOVIET CONSUMER. INDEED, MOUNTING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, BUREAUCRATIC OSSIFICATION AND IDEOLOGICAL MALAISE COULD INDUCE A NEW LEADERSHIP TO ATTACH EVEN MORE IMPORTANCE THAN IN THE PAST TO THE ONE ATTRIBUTE OF SUPER-POWER STATUS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION FULLY ENJOYS- ITS MILITARY STRENGTH.

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(1) MILITARY BALANCE:

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9. THE CONTINUING GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER WILL BE A MAJOR ELEMENT IN SOVIET EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN ITS FAVOUR BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE MILITARY BALANCE TOWARDS THE WARSAW PACT WOULD HAVE A DIRECT AND VERY UNDESIRABLE EFFECT ON THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE DEGREE OF RISK INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTING TO TRANSLATE MILITARY POWER INTO POLITICAL INFLUENCE. THE MORE IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A DESTABILISING IMBALANCE ARISES FROM THE CONTINUING SOVIET BUILD-UP IN
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THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD.

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10. IN THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, THE GROWING SOVIET MILITARY POWER CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVELY BALANCED IF THE ALLIES TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO MODERNISE AND STRENGTHEN THEIR OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THE MAINTENANCE OF A SATISFACTORY BALANCE IN BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL TERMS IS THE ONLY WAY TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIES, AND TO ENSURE THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS CAN PURSUE THEIR DETENTE POLICIES IN SAFETY AND WITH CONFIDENCE.

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11. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY ALLIED MILITARY CAPACITY OVER THE LONG TERM AND THE ALLOCATION OF A SUFFICIENT PROPORTION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES TO DEFENCE, THE FIRM SUPPORT OF PUBLIC OPINION REMAINS INDISPENSABLE. RENEWED WESTERN ECONOMIC HEALTH WOULD, IN ADDITION TO ITS OTHER MANIFEST ADVANTAGES, CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO WESTERN SECURITY. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE'S DEFENSIVE CAPACITY DEPENDS ALSO ON THE SOLIDARITY SHOWN BY ITS

MEMBERS IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THEIR SECURITY AND TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO ANY THREAT. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON DEVELOPING SECURITY ISSUES.

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(2) POSSIBILITIES FOR EAST-WEST COOPERATION:

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12. DURING THE LAST DECADE THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAS BECOME MORE INTENSIVE AND VARIED. POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION, TOGETHER WITH MODEST PROGRESS IN HUMAN CONTACTS, NOW CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IN THE PERIOD AHEAD THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE INCREASED PRESSURES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND, EVEN
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MORE SO, IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR ENLARGING THE SPHERES OF COLLABORATION WITH THE WEST.

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13. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES TO SEE COOPERATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION AS BEING IN EASTERN NATIONAL INTERESTS. FULL USE CAN BE MADE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT--AS A COMMON BASIS FOR THE MULTILATERAL EAST-WEST PROCESS--TO STIMULATE COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION ACROSS A BROAD RANGE OF AREAS. AT THE SAME TIME, WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD MAINTAIN THEIR INSISTENCE THAT DETENTE CANNOT BE APPLIED SELECTIVELY.

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14. THE ALLIES WILL NEED TO REMAIN SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THEIR ACTIONS ON A NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP. POSITIVE INCENTIVES OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION CAN PLAY A ROLE, AS CAN SOVIET PERCEPTION OF WESTERN STRENGTH AND RESOLVE IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY.

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15. AS REGARDS EASTERN EUROPE, THE ALLIES SHOULD AIM PRUDENTLY TO ENCOURAGE A GRADUAL EVOLUTION IN A FAVOURABLE DIRECTION. THE SCOPE FOR SUCH A POLICY IS GREATEST IN THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL AREAS ESPECIALLY THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS.

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(3) ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

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16. PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IS INDISPENSABLE FOR A DURABLE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE MAINTENANCE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES MUST BE A CONSTANT AIM, NOT ONLY ON ITS OWN MERITS, BUT ALSO IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE DEFENCE EFFORT AND BECAUSE OF ITS BENEFITS TO WESTERN ECONOMIES. HOWEVER, THE TASK AHEAD WILL NOT BE AN EASY ONE. IT HAS TO BE RECOGNISED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE SO FAR

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ACCEPTED THE DESIRABILITY OF PARITY ONLY AS FAR AS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CONCERNED, AND HAVE MEANWHILE CONTINUED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR CONVENTIONAL AND THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES; THIS FACT IS ONE OF THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS CASTING DOUBT ON OVERALL SOVIET INTENTIONS.

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17. CONTINUING PROGRESS IN THE US/SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, WOULD HAVE A HIGHLY FAVOURABLE EFFECT ON DETENTE. EFFORTS SHOULD ALSO BE MAINTAINED TO OBTAIN REALISTIC MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN OTHER AREAS, CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR. THE GOAL IS TO BRING ABOUT AN EFFECTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN ARMAMENTS AND TO TACKLE THE REAL CAUSES OF DANGER, NOT LEAST THE IMBALANCE IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE THEIR FRUITFUL CONSULTATIONS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS.

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(4) ECONOMIC ASPECTS

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18. AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SOVIET DETENTE POLICY IS ACCESS TO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, CREDITS AND TRADE. THE MAINTENANCE OF A SOVIET VESTED ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE CONTINUATION OF THE DETENTE PROCESS MAY OFFER SOME SCOPE FOR OBTAINING LIMITED SOVIET CONCESSIONS BUT WESTERN ABILITY TO BRING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON SOVIET POLICIES SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. AS A LONG-TERM PROCESS, IT WOULD SEEM IN WESTERN INTERESTS TO PROMOTE A DEGREE OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE WHICH WOULD MAKE REVERSION BY SOVIET LEADERS TO A MORE HOSTILE PROFILE A MORE DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL DECISION. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS MAY BE STILL GREATER IN THE CASE OF EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, WHERE WESTERN ECONOMIC TIES COULD HELP TO ENCOURAGE GRADUAL TRENDS TOWARDS

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AUTONOMY AND INTERNAL LIBERALISATION.

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19. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE HOW MUCH MILITARY ADVANTAGE THE SOVIET UNION GAINS FROM EAST-WEST TRADE. IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT ANYTHING WHICH HELPS, EVEN IN A LIMITED WAY, TO MODERNISE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND WHICH EASES PRESSURES ON THE CIVILIAN SECTOR MUST RELEASE MORE RESOURCES FOR THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. SOME OF THE AREAS IN WHICH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE SHOWN A MAJOR INTEREST IN WESTERN TECHNOLOGY ARE RELEVANT TO AREAS WHERE THEY LAG BEHIND THE WEST MILITARILY. THE RISK TO THE WEST SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. HOWEVER, PROVIDED THE TRANSFER OF GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY OF DIRECT

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE CONTINUES TO BE EXCLUDED (AS IS DONE THROUGH COCOM), THE POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF EXPANDING EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS SHOULD OUTWEIGH ANY INDIRECT BENEFITS TO THE SOVIET DEFENCE EFFORT.

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(5) EUROPE:

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20. AS PART OF THE GOAL OF ASSERTING ITSELF AS THE DOMINANT POWER IN EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE WESTERN SOLIDARITY. IN PARTICULAR IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO SEEK TO WEAKEN THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AS WELL AS TO OPPOSE ENHANCED POLITICAL COHESION AND INFLUENCE ON THE PART OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST SOVIET ATTEMPTS AT FRAGMENTATION AND INTIMIDATION.

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21. BERLIN AND YUGOSLAVIA ARE THE AREAS IN EUROPE WHERE THE POTENTIAL RISK OF CONFRONTATION SEEMS HIGHEST. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT DETENTE IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH FAILURE TO RESPECT THE AGREEMENTS WHICH HAVE ALLOWED IT TO DEVELOP, IN PARTICULAR THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 3RD SEPTEMBER, 1971 ON BERLIN. AS REGARDS YUGOSLAVIA, A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN SOVIET CALCULATIONS WILL BE THEIR ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN DETERMINATION TO UPHOLD YUGOSLAV SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT.

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TIONS WILL BE THEIR ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN DETERMINATION TO UPHOLD YUGOSLAV SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT.

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(6) THIRD WORLD, NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

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22. THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE EXTENT OF SOVIET

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LEMENT IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA HAS DEMONSTRATED THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE CONSTRAINT ON SOVIET POLICIES IMPOSED BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC OPINION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL WANT TO AVOID ANY SERIOUS RISK OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS LIKELY TO REMAIN AN OVERRIDING CONSTRAINT ON, FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO TEST THE LIMITS OF THE TOLERANCE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

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23. THE OUTLOOK IS THUS FOR VARIOUS FORMS OF COMPETITION AND CONFLICT. THIS MUST BE A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE ALLIES BECAUSE OF BOTH THE DANGER OF LOCAL CONFLICTS ESCALATING AND THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSION ON WESTERN

INTERESTS INCLUDING THE SUPPLY OF ENERGY AND OTHER VITAL RAW MATERIALS. MOREOVER, UNCONSTRAINED SOVIET EXPANSION OF THEIR INFLUENCE IN SOME AREAS COULD INCREASE THE DANGER OF SOVIET RISK-TAKING IN OTHER AREAS. THE ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE INSIST THAT DETENTE CANNOT BE APPLIED SELECTIVELY AND WILL BE COMPROMISED BY ATTEMPTS TO GAIN UNILATERAL SECRET

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ADVANTAGES, ESPECIALLY IN THE FORM OF EXTERNAL ARMED INTERVENTION. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD THEREFORE REGARD THEIR SUCCESSFUL PURSUIT OF THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE AS A MEANS OF ENCOURAGING GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD, WHICH IN TURN REINFORCES WESTERN SECURITY.

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24. ACTIVE AS THE SOVIETS WILL BE IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY ARE UNLIKELY, BECAUSE OF ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES, TO BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OR TO ENTER THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY INCREASINGLY SEEK METHODS OF DISRUPTING AND DISCREDITING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WEST IN THIS AREA.

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(7) HUMAN RIGHTS:

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25. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS MAY CONTINUE SLOWLY TO EVOLVE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE TENSION BETWEEN DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS MAY CAUSE UNCERTAINTY AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE DECISIONS OF THE SOVIET REGIME IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. THERE WILL BE A PERSISTENT TENDENCY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION TO INTERPRET THE LEGITIMATE WESTERN INTEREST IN THESE ISSUES AS A COUNTER-ATTACK ON THE IDEOLOGICAL FRONT.

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26. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT, AS STATED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION. WESTERN INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY MAINTAINING CONSTANT BUT JUDICIOUS PRESSURE FOR GRADUAL IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS, AND BY CONTINUING TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY, WHILE AVOIDING THE DEGREE OF OPEN CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY RISK PROVOKING A HARDENING OF DOMESTIC POLICIES. THE CSCE EXPERIENCE HAS SECRET

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SHOWN THAT SOVIET TOLERANCE, AT LEAST IN CERTAIN AREAS, CAN BE INFLUENCED SOMEWHAT, AND THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE-RELATED ISSUES.

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(8) IDEOLOGY

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27. SOVIET IDEOLOGY WILL BE INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT TO MUCH OF THE SOVIET POPULATION AND TO MANY OF THOSE PEOPLE IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD TO WHOM THE SOVIET UNION WISHES TO APPEAL. NONETHELESS, IDEOLOGY WILL CONTINUE TO SHAPE THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD AND WILL BE USED TO JUSTIFY SOVIET POLICIES BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE EUROPE. THE ONE-SIDED CLAIM OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES TO EXTEND THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE AGAINST THE WEST WHILE DENYING OTHERS THE RIGHT TO CRITICISE EASTERN SYSTEMS IS BASICALLY INCONSISTENT WITH DETENTE AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEST. THE USSR INSISTS ON EXCLUDING THE COMPETITION OF IDEAS FROM THE CONCEPT OF DETENTE OR THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. THIS SHOULD NOT DETER THE ALLIES FROM CONTINUING TO EMPHASISE THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL VITALITY OF THE WEST. THEY SHOULD DEFINE AND EXPLAIN THEIR OWN VALUES AND CONVICTIONS WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, URGE RESTRAINT AS REGARDS METHODS AND LEVEL OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION.

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28. EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION NO LONGER EXERCISES THE DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT THAT IT ONCE POSSESSED, IT WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO USE THE INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES WHERE POSSIBLE TO FURTHER SOVIET AIMS.

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CONCLUSION

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29. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A STRONG WESTERN DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE AND TO PURSUE THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IN THE LATTER CONTEXT, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT REMAINS A UNIQUELY APPROPRIATE MEANS OF MONITORING AND ENCOURAGING THE PROGRESS OF DETENTE. IN THE LONG RUN, SECURITY CAN BEST BE FURTHERED BY MEANS WHICH SEEK TO MOVE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN A DIRECTION OF MORE RESPONSIBILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY AND TOWARDS MORE TOLERANT AND OPEN SOCIETIES. ONE MEANS MIGHT BE TO ENCOURAGE GREATER EAST-WEST ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WILL NEED TO BE KEPT CAREFULLY IN MIND. THE ALLIANCE REMAINS THE MOST EFFECTIVE FORUM FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THESE MATTERS. THE ALLIES SHOULD PUBLICLY REAFFIRM THEIR CONVICTION THAT THEIR ALLIANCE AND THEIR SOLIDARITY REMAIN THE IRREPLACEABLE GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF EACH OF THEM, OF THE FREEDOM OF THEIR PEOPLES, AND OF PEACE. END TEXT. GLITMAN UNQUOTE VANCE

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**Subject:** ALLIANCE EAST-WEST STUDY: NEW COMPOSITE PART III DRAFT -  
**TAGS:** PORG, MARR, PINR, US, XT, NATO  
**To:** n/a INFO SECDEF  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/21793895-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
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